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PRODUCT COMPETITION IN THE RELEVANT MARKET 
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 
David Macdonald* 
0 NE of the most vexatious problems in antitrust law today is the measurement of monopoly power in connection with section 2 
of the Sherman Act.1 The federal courts have simultaneously used 
two methods of accomplishing this purpose.2 The first, called the 
"behavior" or "public injury" test, consists of analyzing the behavior 
of the putative monopolist and comparing it to behavior thought to be 
typical of monopolies. Under this approach the presence of some of 
these behavior patterns is considered proof that monopoly power exists. 
The second method, upon which more emphasis has been placed in 
recent years, emphasizes the measurement of the control over the "mar-
ket" which the monopolist exerts.3 One of the prime factors by which 
control is calculated is the percentage of the market occupied by the 
monopolist.4 The larger the percentage, the more likely that monopoly 
power exists. Underlying the "market control" test, however, is the 
assumption that there has been a correct delimitation of that market 
insofar as products, geographic area, time element and type of customer 
are involved. If the defined market includes too many products or too 
large an area, the power of the defendant will seem to be less than it 
really is. On the other hand, if the market is delimited so as to exclude 
close substitutes available to customers of the defendant, the occupa-
tion and power of the defendant over the market will be exaggerated. 
A recent illustration of this is found in the du Pont cellophane case, 
where monopolization of moistureproof cellophane was charged.5 Du 
Pont claimed that the relevant market should include not only moisture--
,. Member, Student Editorial Board, Michigan Law Review.-Ed. 
1 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states . . • shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor •••• " 15 U.S.C. (1952) §2. 
2E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (1946); 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416; and see 
Mason, "The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States," 62 HARv. 
L. Rllv. 1265 at 1267 (1949). 
3 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416; 
Edwards, ''Public Policy and Business Size," 24 J. OF BusINEss 280 (1951). 
4 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416; 
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953). Other 
factors, according to Mason, note 2 supra, are (1) the number of firms in the market; (2) 
evidence of collusion; (3) conditions of entry. 
11 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. 
Supp. 41. 
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proof cellophane, but all flexible wrappings. Of course, du Pont' s 
percentage share of the former was much larger than that of the latter. 
From this it can be seen that "a delimitation of the market, in and of 
itself, may sometimes determine the outcome of antitrust litigation."6 
This is so even though the "relative effect of percentage command of 
a market varies with the setting in which that factor is placed."7 It 
should be noted that the du Pont example included only the product 
market. The same problem may arise with geographic, time and con-
sumer factors. Market determination is also a problem in section I 
proceedings, especially those involving mergers.8 The percentage of 
the market foreclosed is important in order to determine whether the 
merger constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.9 
The correct delimitation of the relevant market is the problem to 
be examined here. First the legal development of market concepts 
will be traced. Then, with the objective of coalescing the legal and 
economic concepts of .the market, a test will be proposed with which 
to measure the correct market in any given case. 
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET CONCEPTS IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 
The Supreme Court, in early cases involving market delimitation, 
seized upon the phrase "any part of trade or commerce" in section 2 
of the Sherman Act and equated it to the concept of the relevant 
market. This notion stemmed from the famous Standard Oil case 
of 1911, where the Court said: 
"The commerce referred t~ by the words 'any part' construed 
in the light of the manifest purpose of the statute has both a 
geographical and a distributive significance, that is it includes 
any portion of the United States and any of the classes of things 
forming a part of interstate or foreign commerce."10 
6 Judge Knox in United States v. Aluminum. Co. of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 
F. Supp. 333 at 355-356. 
1 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 528, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948). 
s Seeton 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States 
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal •••. " 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1. 
9 Justice Reed in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 527., 68 S.Ct. 
1107 (1948), said: "In determining what constitutes umeasonable restraint, we do not 
think the dollar volume is in itself of compelling significance; we look rather to the per-
centage of business controlled, the· strength of the remaining competition, whether the 
action springs from business requirements or purpose to monopolize, the probable develop-
ments of the industry, consumer demands, and other characteristics of the market." 
10 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 at 61, 31 S.Ct. 502 (1911). 
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A possible, if not probable, construction of this quotation in the 
light of its context is that the Supreme Court, as it regarded the 
statute of that time, was outlining only one of the two requirements 
before the offense of monopolization could be found. The first re-
quirement was a showing of the exercise of monopoly power, or mo-
nopoly behavior. Thus the Court, in the succeeding paragraph, went 
on to say, "Undoubtedly, the words 'to monopolize' and 'monopolize' 
as used in the section reach every act bringing about the prohibited 
results." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The results to which the Court referred were the power to fix 
prices, to limit production, and to deteriorate the product. The second 
requirement of the act was that these results must occur in a "part 
of trade or commerce." If this conduct was purely local, Congress 
would have no power to deal with it, since the Sherman Act is based 
on the interstate commerce power.11 On the other hand, it is con-
ceivable that the defendant might have complete control over a "part 
of trade or commerce" as construed by the Supreme Court, and yet 
be unable to wield monopoly power because of the existence of other 
products in trade or commerce which are close substitutes for that of 
the defendant. In effect, this was the claim of du Pont. 
Later opinions by the federal courts, however, construed the Stand-
ard Oil quotation to sanction a finding of monopoly power wherever 
the percentage share of the defendant over the relevant "part of trade 
or commerce" was considered sufficiently large.12 In other words, the 
Standard Oil case serves as a basis for the "market control" test of 
monopoly power. This alone might not be undesirable; but, as will 
be pointed out presently, the courts have tended until very recently 
to use this phrase, originally intended for interstate commerce, in 
order to delimit the market for purposes of establishing monopoly 
power. 
A review of the decisions involving market determination sug-
gests four factors which the courts have found to be important in 
making up the relevant market: product, area, time and type of cus-
tomer. The first category, that relating to products, may in turn be 
11 Id. at 68-69, and the cases there cited. It should be noted that a spate of litigation 
ensued involving the interpretation of "any part of trade or commerce" solely in connection 
with the question whether the defendant was in interstate commerce. See, for example, 
Peto v. Howell, (7th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 353. 
12Notably, the cases of Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 
268, 53 S.Ct. 182 (1934); and see United States v. Com Products Refining Co., (D.C. 
N.Y. 1916) 234 F. 964; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1650 
(1947). 
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subdivided into two parts: (I) those products which are physically 
identical with the product of the defendant; (2) those which, although 
having a function similar to that of the defendant's product, are 
physically distinguishable. In the first type, two precedent conditions 
have been placed upon other products before they are considered in 
the same market as the product of the defendant. The alleged sub-
stitute product must have a cost basis per unit which is the same as 
or less than the defendant's, and there must be no reason for cus-
tomers to prefer the product of the defendant over the substitute 
even though it is indistinguishable. The first condition is illustrated 
by the Corn Products and the first Alcoa cases.13 The defendant in 
the Corn Products case was charged with monopolizing pearl starch. 
The company contended that pearl starch was used by millers to 
make maltose and that, since other companies produced a similar article 
of commerce, "brewers grits," to be used for maltose, the latter product 
should be considered to be in the same market. Judge Learned Hand 
rejected this contention, reasoning that since the percentage yield of 
maltose was greater from pearl starch than from brewers grits, Com 
Products could raise the price of pearl starch to the point where the 
cost of the two articles per unit of maltose was the same. Thus the 
producer of pearl starch had a monopoly, limited, however, by the 
amount of the cost differential.14 Again in the first Alcoa case, Judge 
Hand excluded imported virgin aluminum ingot from the market with 
domestic virgin ingot since, to the extent of the tariff on imported 
aluminum, Alcoa wielded monopoly power over domestic aluminum.15 
This finding is somewhat clouded by Judge Knox's market discussion 
in the Alcoa Remedy case, a proceeding to determine the remedy to 
be applied against Alcoa after the finding of a violation of section 2 
by Judge Hand.16 The court there found that the relevant market 
was no longer virgin aluminum ingot sold in the United States, but 
fabricated aluminum sales, which includes sales of fabrications from 
imported ingot. The exclusion of identical products which have a 
higher cost differential has not been specifically challenged, however. 
The other condition before physically indistinguishable products 
1~ United States v. Com Products Refining Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1916) 234 F. 964; 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416. 
14 United States v. Com Products Refining Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1916) 234 F. 964 at 
974-977. 
15 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416 at 
426. _ 
16 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 
at 355-364. 
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may be included in the same market is that there be no basis for 
preferring one over the other. This problem is exemplified by the 
Motion Picture Cases.17 There the defendants were charged with 
monopolizing first run pictures. First run films are those shown for 
the first time in a given area. By agreement, the same film cannot 
be shown in the same area for a limited time after the initial showing. 
Then it is released again as a second run picture. There is no physical 
distinction between first and second run motion pictures, but the Court 
found that the former were the "cream of the exhibition business" 
and thus a separate market, or a separate "part of trade or commerce."18 
The second type of product substitution, involving physically dis-
tinguishable products, has been the subject of more litigation than 
the first. In general, products which are physically distinguishable 
from the product of the defendant have been excluded from the mar-
ket.19 A possible change in attitude has recently been indicated by 
the Times-Picayune2° and the du Pont cellophane cases.21 These 
decisions have exhibited more of a tendency to look at actual market 
conditions in determining the relevant market. The traditional an-
alysis, however, turned on an interpretation of the "any part" clause. 
In one case,22 farm paper advertisements in the Midwest were held to 
be the salient market and the subject of a combination to monopolize. 
The ratiocination of the Supreme Court was merely that section 2 
applies to any part of the class of things forming a part of interstate 
commerce, as opposed to the whole. No economic analysis of sub-
stitute products, such as other newspapers, was considered. While 
17 Including Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. llO, 68 S.Ct. 947 
(1948); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948). 
lS United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 at 172-173, 68 S.Ct. 915 
(1948). In a sense the products were not identical, since the monopoly power could be 
said to exist in the contract rights which first run theatres enjoyed over others, and not the 
product itself. 
19 Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268, 55 S.Ct. 182 
(1934); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945); Schine 
Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 68 S.Ct. 947 (1948); United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948); United States v. United Shoe 
Machinery Co., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295. All these decisions involved pro-
ceedings under §§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. For a case based solely on §1, which 
states substantially the same principle, see O'Halloran v. American Sea Green Slate Co., 
(D.C. N.Y. 1913) 207 F. 187, a civil suit where product substitution in closely related 
products was held not to eliminate the :finding of monopoly but only to mitigate the 
damages. Cf. Fashion Orginators Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, (2d Cir. 1950) 114 
F. (2d) 80. 
20 Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953). 
21 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) I18 F. 
Supp. 41. 
22 Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268, 55 S.Ct. 182 
(1934). 
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the Court may have happened on the correct geographic and product 
markets, its reasoning gives support to the idea that the part of com-
merce intended by the Standard Oil case to satisfy the interstate com-
merce requirements was also being used as a basis for measuring the 
alleged monopolist's percentage occupation of the market. In an-
other proceeding, each dress pattern controlled by the Fashion Orig-
inator's Guild was held to be the subject of a monopoly "however 
trifling the basis for preferring it may be."23 A slight basis for prefer-
ence supported the encompassment of each dress design in a different 
market. · 
The courts have made some reference to possible criteria by which 
products may be included or excluded from a market. The amount 
of handicap which the monopolist can impose on customers was 
deemed a measure of monopoly power in the Associated Press case, 
although there was no indication of how much of a handicap would 
be allowable before the act was violated.24 A market was delimited 
in that case to include only the Associated Press, even though the 
handicap imposed by that newsgathering association over non-members 
may have been small.25 Another indication of a touchstone which 
has been suggested is found in the Paramount Pictures case.26 There, 
the defendants controlled the "cream" of the exhibition business, that 
is, first run motion pictures, and this was held to exclude other film 
exhibitions from the relevant market. The criteria as elaborated by 
the Supreme Court in these two cases seem to indicate only that the 
Court was still following the rule under which any physical differ-
ence between products, giving one a modicum of customer prefer-
ence, serves to separate the products into two markets. 
In 1953, however, the Supreme Court, in the Times-Picayune 
case,27 exhibited a willingness to recognize that two products, while 
physically distinguishable, may be considered by their customers for 
23 Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, (2d Cir. 1950) 114 F. 
(2d) 80 at 85. The court also states in this connection: "Although all dresses made after 
one design are fungibles, the different designs themselves are not fungibles." 
24Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945). 
25 The Supreme Court excluded other newsgathering associations, such as the United 
Press and International News Service. It cited with approval the district court opinion, 
which had said: "Most monopolies, like most patents, give control over only some means 
of production for which there is a substitute; the possessor enjoys an advantage over his 
competitors, but he can seldom shut them out altogether; his monopoly is measured by the 
handicap he can impose." United States v. Associated Press, (D.C. N.Y. 1943) 52 F. 
Supp. 362 at 371, cited in 326 U.S. 1 at 17, note 17. Another, and seemingly better 
ground for the decision was based on exclusion of non-member newspapers by members. 
26 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 at 172-173, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948). 
27Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953). 
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all practical purposes to be substitutes for each other, and thus be 
included in the same market. The case involved three newspapers, 
the morning Times-Picayune, the afternoon States and the afternoon 
Item. The States and Times-Picayune were published by the same 
company. The complaint alleged that the publisher of these two 
papers instituted a unit plan whereby an advertiser, in order to ob-
tain an advertisement in one newspaper, had to pay for advertise-
ments in both issues as a unit, and by this means the publishing 
company was using the dominant position of the morning Times-
Picayune to squeeze out the Item in the afternoon advertisement mar-
ket, or, more specifically, the afternoon "want ad" and national ad-
vertising markets. The Court reasoned that since the government 
charged a tying arrangement, "the whole and not a part of a relevant 
market must be assigned controlling weight."28 The Court then found 
that since there was no proof that advertisers distinguished between 
the morning and afternoon papers, although readers might, the rele-
vant market contained all three newspapers. The Times-Picayune 
controlled 40 percent of this market, a percentage held not to be 
violative of the act.29 The important part of the opinion for the 
purposes of this paper is a footnote in which the Court indicated 
a new trend of thought in market delimitation: 
"For every product, substitutes exist. But a relevant market 
cannot meaningfully encompass that infinite range. The circle 
must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, 
within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of 
buyers will turn; in technical terms, products whose 'cross-elas-
ticities of demand' are small. Useful to that determination is, 
among other things, the trade's own characterization of the prod-
ucts involved."30 
This statement of course indicates that the Supreme Court is 
willing to include in the same market products which are physically 
distinguishable as long as customers find them highly interchange-
able in use. The Supreme Court also implied, however, that this is 
not necessarily the test to be used outside of alleged tying clause 
cases.31 Whether this liberal definition of the relevant market is to 
2s Id. at 611. 
29 Furthermore, since the two products were not distinguishable to advertisers, the 
contracts were held not to be tying agreements at all. Id. at 613-614. 
so Id. at 612, note 31. Cross-elasticity of demand is defined as the response of one 
firm's sales to the price variations of another firm. SCITovsKY, WELFARE AND CoMPEn-
TION 396 (1951). See also the definition by Joe Bain, infra, note 63. 
81 "But the essence of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of monopolistic 
leverage; a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into 
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be followed in other section 2 litigations remains an open question 
at the Supreme Court level. One lower court has, however, indi-
cated a willingness to follow the Times-Picayune reasoning in a mo-
nopolization case not involving a tying clause. This is United. States 
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours.32 The government in this case brought 
a civil action under section 4 of the Sherman Act charging du Pont 
with violating section 2, and alleging monopolization of the moisture-
proof cellophane market. Among other defenses, du Pont claimed 
that moistureproof cellophane was not a "part of trade or commerce" 
within the meaning of section 2, and that all :flexible wrappings should 
be the basis from which monopoly power and occupation of the mar-
ket should be determined. If the government's contention were 
found to be correct, du Pont controlled 68 percent of the market, a 
strong indication of monopoly power. On the other hand, if du 
Pont' s own definition of the market was accepted, the percentage of 
occupation would be less than 20 percent. 
The government employed a two-pronged attack. First, it claimed 
that moistureproof cellophane was distinguishable from other types 
of :flexible wrappings and, therefore, in the light of- past Supreme 
Court decisions, constituted as a matter of law a separate part of com-
merce. 33 This contention was rejected by the court. Second, the 
government contended that, as a question of fact, there was such a 
strong consumer preference for moistureproof cellophane that a mo-
nopoly existed. Preference was claimed to be based on a superior 
combination of the characteristics of absolute transparency, greater 
eye appeal, moistureproofness, durability and printability, machine 
running qualities, coated adhesion and excellent all around protec-
tion.34 To this contention, du Pont took the position that market 
control was a questic;m of fact and could be determined only by ex-
tensive analysis of the market.35 They minimized the value of com-
paring physical qualities of the flexible wrapping products and em-
phasized actual consumer behavior. Three approaches were used by 
du Pont to prove that flexible wrapping materials should be con-
sidered as parts of one market. First, after analyzing the uses to 
which purchasers put cellophane, du Pont determined the other prod-
the next. Solely for testing the strength of that lever, the whole and not part of the rele-
vant market must be assigned controlling weight." Time-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594 at 611, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953). 
32 (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 41. 
33 Brief for the United States, pp. 44-53, 77-147. 
34Brief for the United States, pp. 108-109. 
35 Brief for the Defendant, pp. 13-14. 
1954] THE RELEVANT MAmrnT 77 
nets which were being put to the same uses. 36 For example, moisture-
proof cellophane is used as a candy wrapper. Candy manufacturers, 
however, also use glassine, waxed paper, plain cellophane, aluminum 
foil, pliofilm, cellulose acetate and polyethelene. It was contended, 
therefore, that these products were in the same market or part of 
commerce as moistureproof cellophane. This technique was followed 
for all eighteen uses of moistureproof cellophane. Other evidence 
was introduced showing that business had actually changed hands 
many times between moistureproof cellophane and its substitutes. 
Second, du Pont introduced evidence indicating that it had been 
forced to price its product according to the competitive effect of these 
substitutes and develop its product through research to bring moisture-
proof cellophane into a position to compete with other wrappings. 
The third method by which du Pont proved its case was by com-
paring the physical properties of these wrappings. Heat sealability, 
printability, clarity, tear strength, moisture permeability and other 
characteristics were compared which were considered by the con-
sumers of cellophane to be important. The advantageous character-
istics were well spread out among the various types of flexible wrap-
pings. This reinforced the defendant's contention that flexible wrap-
pings were substitutes for one another. 
Faced with this evidence, the court accepted substantially all of 
the defendant's proposed findings of fact, including a finding that 
the relevant market included all flexible packaging materials.37 
Furthermore, the court refused to connect the phrase "any part 
of trade or commerce" with a finding of monopoly power. Rather 
it seemed to revert back to the reasoning of the Standard Oil case 
that a finding of monopoly power was divorced from the phrase "any 
part of commerce." Judge Leahy summed up by stating:38 
''Whether cellophane itself, or plain cellophane, or moisture-
proof cellophane, or colored cellophane, be 'parts' or merely 
some of several products constituting a 'part', the controlling 
question is whether du Pont possesses the requisite monopoly 
powers over price and competition. . . . 
" 'Market control' or lack of 'market control' are ultimate facts. 
They are determined by fact-finding processes, and on the basis 
of knowledge and analysis of all competitive factors which bear 
on a seller's power to raise prices, or to exclude competition. Ex-
36 Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted on Behalf of the Defendant, pp. 111-220. 
37 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. 
Supp. 41 at 60 (Finding 37). 
ss Id. at 196-197. 
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istence of monopoly powers is not made on the basis of assump-
tions as to competitive markets. If the price, quantity of pro-
duction and sale, and the quality of a seller's product are deter-
mined by pressures exerted on him by buyers and sellers of an-
other's product, the products and the sellers must, for purposes 
of any realistic analysis, be in the same 'market' and must be in 
competition with each other." 
In summary, from the du Pont and Times-Picayune cases, there 
are indications that: (I) a realistic economic definition of the market 
as including some product heterogeneity will be accepted by the federal 
courts, and (2) actual market conditions, including customer behavior 
and ,habi_ts, will be analyzed to determine the relevant market, treating 
the question as one of fact and not law.39 
The second factor making up the relevant market is the geographic 
area which should be included. Here again, the courts have been 
somewhat arbitrary in their delimitation of the correct area, usually 
defining it in terms of the scope of the defendant's operations. Thus, 
in the Yellow Cab case,40 the Supreme Court ruled that to have mo-
nopolized the taxi-cab markets in Chicago, Minneapolis, New York 
and Pittsburgh through a subsidiary corporation, and to have excluded 
competition from those cities would constitute a violation of the Sher-
man Act. No consideration was given to the possibility that other 
cab manufacturers may have had equally good- outlets in Cincinnati, 
Detroit, or Cleveland, for example, and that these areas were sub-
stitutes for the cities in which Yellow Cab was operating. 41 
The third limitation which has been considered by the courts is 
that of time. In Peto v. Howell,42 which is ·the only case recognizing 
this limitation, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found 
39 This is also the conclusion of Judge Knox in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at 358. A similar change in attitude is likely 
concerning §1 violations. In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 
1107 (1948), the Court delved into an extensive analysis of various steel product markets 
to determine whether a merger of Columbia Steel and U.S. Steel unreasonably restrained 
competition in those markets. 
40 United States v. Yellow Cab. Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1560 (1947). 
41 The Court's rationalization of the relevant market area was briefly stated: ''The 
Sherman Act is concerned with more than the large, nation-wide obstacles in the channnels 
of interstate trade. It is designed to sweep away all appreciable obstructions so that the 
statutory policy of free trade might be effectively achieved." Id. at 226. Similarly in 
United States v. National City Lines, (7th Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 562, the 45 cities in 
which the defendant had bought public bus companies to supply them with busses were 
found to be the relevant market. See also United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 
495, 68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948), where the arguments were presented as to whether various 
steel products competed in a national or an eleven state area. The Court accepted the 
latter solely for purposes of the decision. Id. at 520. 
42 (7th Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 353. 
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a monopoly in the supply of com moving in interstate commerce 
through Chicago. Com stored in granaries and on farms was ex-
cluded because it could not be shuttled into the Chicago market in 
time to avoid the disastrous effects of the defendant's control. Thus 
the fact that the monopoly power was limited in time did not prevent 
the court from finding a violation.43 However, the court did look to 
the effects of the limited time monopoly on the market, so that in 
this field factual market analysis is likely to play an important part. 
Finally control by a producer of one type of customer has been 
held to violate the act although there were apparently other customers 
in the same area for the same product at the same time. There is 
only one court of appeals decision recognizing this limitation thus 
far.44 Respondents were charged in that case with monopolizing 
busses, petroleum products, tires and tubes used by local transporta-
tion systems in the cities in which defendants controlled the trans-
portation systems.45 The defendant National City Lines had bought 
up transportation companies in 45 cities and had contracted to supply 
them exclusively with busses, tires and tubes, and petroleum products. 
One of the defenses was that the limitation of the market to one type 
of customer (local transportation systems) was too restrictive. Re-
jecting this defense, the court relied heavily on the Yellow Cab case, 46· 
where control over taxi-cab companies was considered a basis for mo-
nopoly power. In the Yellow Cab case, however, the taxi-cab com-
panies were undoubtedly the only customers for taxi-cabs in the four 
city area. Thus the Yellow Cab case is not authority for limiting 
the market to one type of customer, since there happened to be only 
one type of customer in the delimited geographic area. This was 
not necessarily true in the National City Lines case, at least insofar 
as petroleum products are concerned. If there were other potential 
buyers of petroleum products, the National City Lines case is clearly 
distinguishable from the Yellow Cab case. The question remains 
open whether this limitation will gain acceptance. 
To summarize, the federal courts have encompassed the relevant 
market with the above indicated four limitations in their quest for 
43 The court interpreted "any part of trade or commerce" to include the time element. 
"If 'any part' has both a geographical and a distributive significance, it is equally true that 
it may have a significance of limitation in time." Id. at 358. 
44 United States v. National City Lines, (7th Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 562. 
45 Id. at 564. 
46 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1560 (1947). 
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a determination of monopoly power.47 The next section of this paper 
is concerned with the formulation of a test with which to delimit the 
market. 
IL A PROPOSED T:ssT FOR MArurnT DETERMINATION 
A. The Assumptions of the Proposed Test 
The fust assumption in formulating a test for market delimitation 
is that real substitute products should be included in the market al-
though not standardized with the product of the defendant. Econ-
omists have long rejected the concept of pure competition as a practical 
or even desirable objective.48 Despite this, as we have seen above, 
the Supreme Court until very recently has hung on to this simple 
yet unattainable standard and excluded substitute products wherever 
there was any consumer preference because of physical properties or 
for any other reason.49 Something less than pure competition is now 
indicated as an objective by both economist and court, however. 
Various names and definitions have been placed on it. J. M. Clark 
conceives of adequate ,competition as 
" ... rivalry in selling goods, in which each selling unit 
normally seeks maximum net revenue, under conditions such 
that the price or prices each seller can charge are effectively 
limited by the free option of the buyer to buy from a rival seller 
or sellers of what we think of as 'the same' product, necessitating 
an effort by each seller to equal or exceed the attractiveness of 
the others' offerings to a sufficient number of sellers [buyers] to 
accomplish the end in view."50 
47 These are not the only problems in market delimitation. United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416, presents a close question of control 
over the products coming into the market. There, secondary aluminum, while thought to 
be in competition with primary ingot, was excluded from the market because Alcoa, 
through its complete control over primary a few years before, could effectively limit pro-
duction and control the supply of secondary. The finding of control is criticized by Mason 
in 62 HARv. L. R:sv. 1265 at 1273-1274 (1949). It would also seem that if secondary 
aluminum was controlled by Alcoa, it should still be included in the market, thus increas-
ing Alcoa's percentage occupation. 
48 Pure competition may be defined as that market where the commodities are stand-
ardized; the buyers and sellers numerous and small, so that none can appreciably affect the 
price of the commodity, but must take the price as it exists and adjust purchases or output 
to it. Information may be imperfect and custom or other factors hinder the movement of 
capital somewhat. TNEC Monograph No. 21, p. 3 (1940). It is primarily the product 
standardization with which we are here concerned. 
49 See the changing attitude in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 
68 S.Ct. 1107 (1948); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 
872 (1953). 
50 Clark, "Toward a Concept of Workable Competition," 30 AM. EcoN. R:sv. 241 
at 243 (1940). 
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George J. Stigler offers three criteria for "workable competition": 
"An industry is workably competitive when (I) there are a 
considerable number of firms selling closely related products in 
each important market area, (2) these firms are not in collusion, 
and (3) the long run average cost curve for a new £.rm is not 
materially higher than for an established £.rm."51 
81 
One criterion most important for the purposes of defining a product 
market is found in the key words "closely related products."52 Ed-
ward H. Chamberlin, in his book on monopolistic competition,53 
points out that the American economy is one of both competitive and 
monopolistic elements, and that limited monopolies are everywhere 
in competition with each other.54 In a later paper, Mr. Chamberlin 
clarified his position as to the desirability of monopolistic competition, 
pointing out that monopolistic competition is not a defect in the com-
petitive ideal, but a norm from which the ideal may be derived.55 
In summary, then, what is deemed the only feasible, if not a desir-
able, objective is the limitation of the amount of product differentia-
tion some degree short of the uniformity of products found in pure 
competition.56 It should be noted that the sole concern of this paper 
is to determine the products which make up the relevant market, not 
the number of competitors required for "workable" competition. 
The second assumption to be made is that the touchstone used 
to determine which products are "substitute" products is primarily 
concerned with price fixing considerations as determinants of mo-
nopoly power. The idea behind the proposed test is that where the 
customer has a real alternative to tum to, this weakens the power of 
the defendants over prices. Another power commonly considered 
indicative of monopolies is that of excluding competition. Power to 
exclude, however, can be based on other factors, such as control of 
51 Stigler, "The Extent and Bases of Monopoly," 32 AM. EcoN. REv. 1 at 2-3 (Supp., 
June 1942). 
52 Stigler criticizes another definition of workable competition by Clair Wilcox as 
being too vague. That definition is "the availability to buyers of genuine alternatives in 
policy among their sources of supply." W1Lcox, CoMPETITION AND MoNOPOLY IN AMERI-
CAN hrousTRY 8, TNEC Monograph No. 21 (1940). 
53 CHAMBERLIN, Tim THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1938). 
54 Id. at 56-70. 
55 Chamberlin, ''Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy," 40 AMER. EcoN. REv. 
(Papers and Proceedings, May 1950). 
56 Other definitions and discussions of workable or effective competition are found in 
the extensive collection of authorities set out in Oppenheim, ''Federal Antitrust Legislation: 
Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 (1952) notes 
1, 16, 18; and "Divestiture as a Remedy under the Federal Antitrust Laws: Economic 
Background," 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 119 at 123 (1950) note 5. 
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raw materials, patents, or stock holdings of customers. A competitor 
might be excluded from a part of trade although the excluder would 
not be able substantially to control prices over the market. An example 
of this is the Fashion Originators Guild· case.57 Although competi-
tors were excluded from using each dress pattern, ownership of only 
one pattern would hardly give the owner appreciable power to set 
the pattern's price.58 Thus, the products from which a company 
can exclude competitors may not ·themselves constitute a relevant 
market, although the Supreme Court has on occasion considered them 
as such.59 
Finally, it is assumed that market delimitation can be accomplished 
through an analysis of the structure and behavior of the relevant 
market.60 
B. The Proposed Test 
The test which the writer proposes, therefore, may be stated thus: 
can the average customer change without substantial difficulty from 
the product of the defendant to the product claimed to be in the same 
market with that of the defendant? 
It should be noted that the word "product" is used in its larger 
sense and is interchangeable with "service." 
An attempt is made here to equate "large cross-elasticity of de-
mand," a test suggested by Chamberlin61 and the Supreme Court62 
with "change . . . without substantial difficulty." Cross-elasticity 
57 Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, (2d Cir. 1950) 114 F. 
(2d) 80. 
58 This situation also existed to some degree in the following cases: Associated Press 
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945); Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie 
Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268, 55 S.Ct. 182 (1934); Schine Chain Theatres v. United 
States, 334 U.S. 110, 68 S.Ct. 947 (1948); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 
U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 
1560 (1947); United States v. National City Lines, (7th Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 562. 
59 The fact that the court was primarily concerned with exclusion of competition may 
be a valid basis for distinguishing the different market determinations in such cases as the 
Fashion Originators Guild case, from cases where price fixing or monopoly power over 
customers was the foremost point of contention, as in the du Pont cellophane case. 
60 But see Bain, "Workable Competition in Oligopoly: Theoretical Considerations and 
Some Empirical Evidence," 40 AM.. EcoN. REv. 35-47 (Papers and Proceedings, May 
1950). 
61 Chamberlin, "Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy," 40 AM.. EcoN. REv. 85 
at 101 (Papers and Proceedings, May 1950). Although Professor Chamberlin stated that 
"only when [cross-elasticities of demand] are negligibly small is oligopoly absent," he must 
have inadvertently substituted "negligibly small" for "extremely large." See note 63 infra. 
62Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 612, 73 S.Ct. 872 
(1953): "The circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, 
within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn; in techni-
cal terms, products whose 'cross-elasticities of demand' are small." 
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of demand is defined as the response of one firm's volume of sales 
to the price variations of another firm. 63 If the sales of one firm are 
only slightly affected by the price variations of another firm, its cross-
elasticity is small. If the sales of the first firm fluctuate greatly when · 
price changes occur in the product of the second firm, its cross-elas-
ticity is large. This elasticity is, of course, caused by the readiness 
of the consumer to change products, so that if the consumer can 
change products "without substantial difficulty," the cross-elasticities 
of demand of the two products must be large. 64 The reasons why 
the consumer has been used as the center of the proposed test, and 
not merely the words ''large cross-elasticity of demand" are threefold. 65 
In the first place, cross-elasticity of demand is usually concerned only 
with price competition66 (although it could be adapted to non-price 
competition as well) whereas the proposed test would include all the 
factors which go to make up the consumer's choice of products (e.g., 
quality, warranties on the product, service accompanying the product). 
Second, a test intended for use in the law should avoid technical 
economic terms. Finally, placing the emphasis on the consumer 
more clearly indicates the exact nature of the market, as the following 
remarks may indicate. 67 
63 ScrrovsKY, WELFARE AND CoMPE'lTnON 396 (1951). Bain, in his book PRICING, 
ThSTRIBunoN, AND EMPLOYMENT, rev. ed., 51 (1953), defines cross-elasticity of demand 
as follows: "Precisely defined, it should be noted that cross-elasticity measures simply the 
tendency of buyers to shift from one good to another when the price of the latter changes, 
regardless of the ability or disposition of the sellers of the latter to supply them." And on 
page 52, Mr. Bain notes: "A low cross-elasticity indicates poor substitutes; a high cross-
elasticity indicates close substitutes." One caveat should be set out-the cross elasticity of 
demand for product B should be measured in relation to a price decrease of product A, 
not a price increase. Otherwise, whenever there are many close substitutes, a price increase 
in product A would benefit each rival only slightly, although product A might lose almost 
all its customers. This would show up deceptively as a small cross-elasticity of demand 
between product A and each of its substitutes. The whole problem of product demand is 
considered extensively in BAIN, at pp. 17-82. 
64 The exact measurement of cross-elasticity of demand curves has rarely been accom-
plished and is not required in applying the test. All that is required of the defendant is 
evidence showing that consumers have not considered it difficult to change back and forth 
among the products claimed to be in the same market. 
65 Substitutability of production as well as substitutability in consumption must be 
taken into account if the circumstances require. For example, it may be that the alleged 
competitors of the defendant are producing at 100% capacity while the defendant is pro-
ducing at 50% capacity. Thus the competitors cannot expand production in order to force 
the defendant out of the market. This, however, is one of the factors entering into a 
determination of the power of the defendant in a given market, after the market itself has 
been determined. 
66 See SC1TovsKY, WELFARE AND CoMPEnnoN 396 (1951); BAIN, PRICING, DxsTRI-
lltlTl0N, AND EMPLOYMENT, rev. ed., 50-53 (1953). 
67 The "market" as here defined centers on an individual :Ii.rm and not a group of 
similar firms. In other words the market may be different for each individual firm, due to 
differences in type of product and geographical area in which the product is produced. For 
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The proposed test, following the definitions of the economists 
cited, also uses the consumer as the turning point. The "average 
consumer" is treated as a standard similar to the "reasonable man" 
standard in negligence law.68 
On the practical side, the test is meant to endorse and preserve 
the method of fact accumulation used in the du Pont cellophane 
case. 
It should be noted that determining what is meant by "substantial 
difficulty" is primarily a question of degree and is subject to all the 
criticisms for vagueness of any degree question. However, the crite-
rion is no more vague than other provisions of the antitrust laws (e.g., 
section 3 of the Clayton Act)69 and seems to be necessary as a general 
standard involved in a problem of this kind. 
C. The Proposed Test in Operation 
1. Problems Not Covered by the Proposed Test. Monopoly 
power cannot be determined by percentage of market occupation alone. 
After the delimitation of the market is completed, the forces within, 
the market which contribute to or detract from the strength of the 
defendant are taken together with the percentage of the market con-
trolled to determine this power. The factors making up the relevant 
market should be distinguished from those which determine monopoly 
power. A problem involving the latter is found in the Corn Products 
case70 discussed above, in which ''brewers grits" was excluded from 
the market because its cost basis was higher than pearl starch. This 
seems to mistake determinants of power in the relevant market for 
a discussion of the individual firm concept of market, see Papandreou, "Market Structure 
and Monopoly Power," 39 AM. EcoN. REv. 883-897 (1949). For the group concept, see 
Kaldor, "Mrs. Robinson's Economics of Imperfect Competition," 1 EcoNOMICA 335-341 
(1934). 
68 Professor Clare E. Griffin has proposed a test which on its face does not mention 
the consumer. He suggests that where a manufacturer ''has to take into account" the price 
and terms of sale of another manufacturer, the two are in the same competitive market. 
Griffin, ''Economic Objectives and Antitrust Policy," Address before Univ. of Michigan 
Law School Summer Institute on International and Comparative Law, June 17-19, 1953, 
FEDERAL Amn-RusT LAws 30 (1953). Ignoring the difficulty in measuring the degree to 
which the competing manufacturer's price policy must be taken into account in order to be 
in competition, this test still turns on the ability and propensity of the consumer to change 
products. 
69 "Where the effect . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create 
a monopoly •••• " 15 U.S.C. (1952) §14. 
10 United States v. Com Products Refining Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1916) 234 F. 964. The 
case of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416, also 
illustrates this problem insofar as imported aluminum ingot was excluded because a tariff 
restricted the extent to which it could compete with domestic ingot. 
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determinants of the market itself. Cost basis should no more be used 
to delimit the relevant market than a comparison of financial resources 
of the producers. The comparative prices of two products are a facet 
of the products themselves, and as such, -they are one element to be 
considered in applying the proposed test to a given product. 71 
Another problem which is not subsumed under the measuring of 
the market is that of determining which market should be ·measured 
in order to find monopoly power. Judge Knox faced this problem 
in the Alcoa Remedy case.72 He there decided that the market for 
virgin aluminum ingot sold in the United States did not truly reflect 
the amount of competition in the industry and chose to analyze the 
fabrications market instead. Thus, the market from which monopoly 
power is to be determined is a problem precedent to delimiting that 
market.73 
2. Application of the Proposed Test. As a starting point, a 
simple example of product differentiation will be given in order to 
show how two different products may be in the same market. 
Example I. Company A, prosecuted for a section 2 viola-
tion, sells cheap alarm clocks. Company B also sells alarm clocks 
which are far more expensive, but have been proved to be of 
better quality, and are accompanied by a six month warranty and 
faster repair service. These factors compensate each other in 
the mind of the average consumer, such that it would not be 
substantially difficult for him to change from either product to 
the other. Both are in the same market. 
It should be noted here that both price and non-price factors are 
considered in deciding which products are encompassed in the same 
market. 
The same type of case arises in a problem involving only a geo-
graphic delimitation. It may be substantially difficult for a buyer of 
steel in California to order from a Pittsburgh producer as opposed 
71 Joe Bain, in measuring cross-elasticities of demand assumes that the price of both 
products are given as they exist at any one time. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, .AND EM-
PLOYMENT, rev. ed., 51 (1953). 
72 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 
at 355-364. 
73 Still another problem facing the market analyst is that of the "irrational" consumer. 
Should there be a distinction between the "rational" reasons for buying a product and the 
"irrational" ones? The proposed test could be used to fit either conclusion, but it is sug-
gested that, since the actual market situation is the basis of analysis, no distinction should 
be attempted. Difficulty might also be encountered in determining which buying habits 
are "rational" or "irrational." See Chamberlin, ''Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy," 
40 AM. EcoN. REv. 85 (Papers and Proceedings, May 1950). 
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to one in Los Angeles. Both product and geographic factors may be 
present in one case: 
Example 2. Two stores sell ice cream. Store One is four 
blocks closer to householder A than Store Two, but the quality 
of ice cream sold by Store Two is far superior to that of Store 
One. All other factors are equal. Householder A considers 
these two factors to balance each other, so that it is not sub-
stantially difficult to change from one to the other. Both are in 
the same market. 
In the simple example above, traditional Supreme Court analysis 
would consider the product market (quality) and the geographic mar-
ket (distance from consumer) separately. It can easily be seen, how-
ever, that both "markets" are in reality interdependent aspects of one 
"market" from which the consumer chooses. 
The time factor may also be accounted for by the proposed test. 
Example 3. X has control over virtually all the grain moving 
in interstate commerce through Chicago. There are, however, 
many neighboring granaries in which grain is stored and can be 
transported to Chicago. The buyers of grain in Chicago cannot 
afford to wait, however, but must buy from X before this gra~ 
" arrives in Chicago. The grain stored in granaries is not in the 
relevant market with that controlled by X. 
From this example it can be seen that the proposed test might also 
be applied to include and exclude "potential" competition. The ques-
tion is still, "Can the consumer afford to wait for the product to be 
available without substantial difficulty?" Potential competition has 
never been adequately defined, however, and other factors might be 
necessary before a potential competitor can be included in the mar-
ket. One of these is that the potential competitor must be willing 
and able to enter. It can be argued that this test draws the line too 
narrowly in excluding potential competitors for whom the customer 
cannot wait, but whom the producer would probably take into ac-
count.74 Furthermore, some products come onto the market and build 
their own customer demand, such as dress designs. However valid 
these contentions may be, it is possible to define potential competition 
in terms of the proposed test. 
Of course, the time element is also interdependent with the other 
factors. If the quality of a product to be produced at a new plant 
is recognized to be superior, or will cost less, a longer time may be 
74 This argument ignores the fact that monopoly power is still present, however foolish 
it may be to exert it. • 
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allowed before it is "substantially difficult" for the customer to wait 
for it. 
Finally, monopoly power has been held to be attainable over one 
type of consumer. In the National City Lines case,w the defendants 
were charged with monopolizing, among other things, oil products to 
bus customers. Other customers were held to be outside the market. 
Admittedly, there may be a monopoly with respect to one type of 
customer only, if that customer has no available alternatives. There 
is the further condition, however, that the monopolist be able to dis-
criminate against the particular customer. 
Example 4. Du Pont manufactures 80% of all moisture--
proof cellophane. For many end uses, this cellophane comes into 
close competition with other flexible wrappings, but let us say 
that for some candy manufacturers, moistureproof cellophane is 
a necessity, and no other product can be substituted. Du Pont 
can exercise monopoly power ( to fix prices) over these candy 
manufacturers as a separate market only if it can discriminate 
against them. 
This ability to discriminate seems in turn to depend on two con-
ditions. First, du Pont must know when it is selling moistureproof 
cellophane to these customers, so that it will be able to discriminate. 
This would obviously be impossible, for example, with a marketable 
stock which is sold on an exchange where the seller has no knowl-
edge of the identity of the buyer. Second, there must be no public 
law against price discrimination in the particular situation. With 
these limitations it seems doubtful that control over one type of cus-
tomer would often give monopoly power. 
It must be remembered that all of the products of one manufac-
turer do not necessarily fall in the same market with each other. 
Example 5. United Shoe Machinery Company leases shoe 
making machines to shoe manufacturers. United' s percentage 
of the total shoe machinery leases is high, but the machines are 
built for different steps in the shoe making process, although 
some are interchangeable. There is no "market" for all shoe 
machinery. 
In a fact situation somewhat similar to that of example 5, the 
United States district court lumped all shoemaking machines to-, 
gether76 and found monopoly power in United Shoe based upon 
75 United States v. National City Lines, (7th Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 562. 
76 The court excluded some of a type not manufactured by United, a position for which 
there was no apparent economic justification. 
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its percentage of all shoe machinery leased.77 The procedure which 
should be followed under the proposed test is to list the essential steps 
in the shoe manufacturing process. Shoe machines should then be 
divided according to their functions in the shoe manufacturing process 
and the defendant's control over each function measured through his 
percentage of the machines leased for that function. Thus, the 
machines for each shoemaking step are in one market. The rationale 
behind this analysis is simply that a shoe manufacturer as a customer 
cannot substitute all his machines interchangeably, and therefore the 
machines must be divided into groups that can be substituted among 
themselves. It has been implicitly assumed here that it is not sub-
stantially difficult for a shoe manufacturer to change to other lessors 
of the machines serving the same function. 
Another problem should be mentioned here if only to be left un-
answered. Suppose that United Shoe Machinery had complete con-
trol over the machines which performed a unique function. Shoe 
manufacturers could £.nd ·no other machine to use as a substitute for 
that function. The function, however, was unimportant and good 
shoes could easily be manufactured without the machines in question. 
Should monopoly power be ascribed to United over these machines? 
Another way of stating this problem in economic terms is that the 
machine has a large elasticity of demand. The proposed test would 
frame the question thus: "Can the customer do without the defend-
ap.t's product altogether without substantial difficulty?" Since the 
Supreme Court has indicated that large cross-elasticities of demand 
between two products brings them both into the same market, and 
reduces monopoly power of both, it would seem to follow that the 
producer of a product with a large elasticity of demand does not have 
enough monopoly power to come within the confines of the Sherman 
Act. 
The most complex analysis of a market situation, and probably 
the most common, is that concerning the market for a product where 
there is no "average customer" but a number of different types of 
customers using the product for different purposes. This problem 
has already been mentioned in the discussion of monopoly over a 
single type of customer as in example 4. 
Example 6. Du Pont Company manufactures moistureproof 
cellophane. It is used mainly for wrapping products and by 
77 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 
295. 
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"converters" who process it for resale as a wrap. In this example, 
substitute products for moistureproof cellophane are pliofilm, wax-
paper, aluminum foil, and some other flexible wrappers. We 
will assume, however, that only 60% of aluminum foil is used 
as a wrap for products in substitution for moistureproof cello-
phane. Therefore, only that percentage of aluminum foil which 
is used as a flexible wrap may be included in the same market. 
Aluminum foil produced for non-substitutional uses ( 40%) is not 
included in the relevant market. 
89 
Where there are multi-consumer uses for the product, each use 
should be analyzed separately in order to discover what substitutes 
are available for it. This was the procedure followed in the du Pont 
cellophane case.78 The fact that another product may be substituted 
for one use of the defendant's product does not mean that the total 
production of the other product should be included in the market. 
Aluminum may compete with copper as far as some electrical products 
are concerned, but not all copper should be counted in the same 
market with aluminum. Only that portion of copper produced for 
electrical products should be included. In example 6, only 60 per-
cent of aluminum foil should be included in the same market with 
moistureproof cellophane. This limitation was not recognized in the 
cellophane case, although it is not certain that any of the flexible 
wrappings there included in the market had other non-substitutional 
uses with moistureproof cellophane. 
Possibly a larger percentage of the substitute product may be in-
cluded in the market as potential competition if it is shown that more 
of the product was available for the same uses as the defendant's 
product, e.g., more than 60 percent of aluminum foil may be capable 
and ready to be supplied to the flexible wrappings market should the 
market situation change. This does not fit into the proposed test, 
however, and the same problem is involved where a producer of the 
same product as the defendant (i.e., of moistureproof cellophane in 
example 6) is producing at less than capacity.79 
Another problem which may arise involving the heterogeneity of 
the customers themselves is exemplified as follows: 
Example 7. X Theatre Chain is charged with monopolizing 
the exhibition of first run films. An analysis of individuals shows 
78 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. 
Supp. 41. 
79 This would seem to be another problem not of delimiting the market, but of deter-
mining monopoly power after the correct market has been delimited. See Part II-C-1 
above. 
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that 10% see a movie on its first run, 5% on the second run, and 
3% on later runs. When determining whether second and other 
runs are "substitutes" for first run showings, should the fact that 
I 0% of the potential customers have already seen the average 
second run movie segregate them for purposes of analysis, as dif-
ferent consumers were in example 6? 
Again this is a problem of finding the "average" customer in 
order to apply the proposed test. Each customer is in a different 
position. The ones who have seen a movi~ on the first run are un-
likely to consider the same movie, now a second run, as a substitute 
for another first run movie which they have not seen. On the other 
hand, the difference is not nearly as great to the moviegoer who has 
seen neither the first nor the second run movie. If the customers 
are segregated into separate classes on the basis of their peculiar posi-
tions, however, there is no logical end to the trouble, since each cus-
tomer has his individual whims and fancies and also is in a different 
postur~ economically from every other. Therefore, the writer suggests 
that no division along these lines be undertaken, but that the best 
solution possible is a fact analysis of consumer trends and habits, so 
that an attempt can be made to determine a mean among all con-
sumers, e.g., between the moviegoer who has seen the second run 
movie and the one who has not. 
3. Conclusion-Method. It is hop'ed that the proposed test pre-
serves the extensive methods of fact analysis such as those used in 
the du Pont case, while at the same time adapting legal standards to 
economic principles capable pf being translated into admissible evi-
dence in antitrust proceedings. In order to prove the existence of 
substitute products as an ultimate fact and not an abstract concept 
of law, it is necessary that a careful examination be made of market 
structures and behavior, emphasis being placed upon consumer prefer-
ences. Only through such. careful examination can there be effected 
a merger of the economic and legal concepts of the market. 
